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24 August 1954


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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Department review completed

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GENERAL

1. Comment on reported future visit by Nehru to Peiping:

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A visit to Peiping by Indian prime minister Nehru, reportedly scheduled to take place in October or November, would provide Communist China with an unusual opportunity for propaganda exploiting Asian solidarity themes and counteracting Western claims that Asian states are threatened by Communist aggression.

The American embassy in New Delhi believes Nehru is suspicious of Peiping's motives, but that he would nevertheless be encouraged to continue a nonalignment policy immediately advantageous to the Communists.

It seems at this time unlikely that significant changes in Sino-Indian relations would result from the visit, although it would probably be hailed publicly, in both India and China, as evidence of friendlier feeling between the two countries.

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
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5. Burmese defense minister reported negotiating with Communists:

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The American embassy in Rangoon has been informed [redacted]

[redacted] that an important leader of the insurgent Burma Communist Party who was

recently in China is negotiating with Burma's defense leaders, including according to one report Defense Minister Ba Swe. Once a settlement is achieved, the sources allege, the dominant Socialist Party will accept the Communists in a government coalition and Ba Swe will succeed U Nu as premier.

The embassy comments that there is considerable basis for reports that Ba Swe will eventually succeed Nu and believes the Burmese government might be induced to negotiate a settlement with the Communists in the interest of unifying the country. It points out, however, that this would be a complete reversal of present policies.

Comment: During the crisis caused last year by the presence of Chinese Nationalist guerrillas in Burma, the Burmese Communists demanded that they be accepted in a coalition government. Since that time they have not stressed this demand and the government has, at the same time, become more sympathetic to the West.

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Should the Communists decide to reopen this issue, however, they might work for closer relations with Defense Minister Ba Swe, whose views are considerably more leftist than those of other government leaders.

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WESTERN EUROPE

7. Comment on failure of Brussels conference:

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Premier Mendes-France's stubborn stand at Brussels suggests that he intends to ditch EDC, despite assurances given Belgian officials by French Foreign Ministry spokesmen during the course of the conference that his proposals originated as a smoke screen to kill off opposition to the treaty in the French assembly.

Mendes-France told Belgian foreign minister Spaak at the final substantive session of the conference that, subject to a cabinet decision, he would present the treaty to the French assembly on 28 August along with a copy of the concessions the other EDC countries had offered to make, but that he would not ask for a vote of confidence. He told Ambassador Bruce's assistant following this session, however, that he was seriously considering taking the responsibility as head of the government of turning down the EDC treaty completely.

Nevertheless, an outright rebuff by Churchill at the 23 August meeting may incline Mendes-France to present the treaty to the assembly in a favorable light. Moreover, Ambassador Bruce has reported that ex-premier Pinay was seriously canvassing the prospects of rallying a movement to bring the original text of the treaty to a vote.

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